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1.  Introduction 
 
This  paper  looks  at  change  and  continuity  in 
the  EU  budget  and  attempts  to  further  our 
understanding of when and how change in the 
EU  budget  appears.  Several  budgetary 
developments since 2005 will be used as case 
studies in this work to conceptualise different 
kinds  of  attempted  change,  their  success  or 
failure  and  their  eventual  drivers.  Given  the 
lack of in-depth analysis of EU budget politics,
3 
this work fills a gap in analytical research on 
the most recent budgetary developments prior 
to  the  tabling  of  the  proposal  f or  the 
multiannual financial perspectives 2014-2020. 
 
In  the  following  section ,  two  theoretical 
frameworks (advocacy coalition framework and 
incrementalism)  will  be  presented  to 
conceptualise change and stability. The third 
section  fills  this  debate  with  a n  empirical 
analysis of budget change in the EU on the 
level of constitutional changes, the multiannual 
framework and more recent initiatives. These 
findings will be summarised in the concluding 
remarks. 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
1 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 
2011 Asian Workshop on EU Studies organised by the EU 
Centre in Taiwan (EUTW), held at the National Taiwan 
University.  I  am  grateful  for  the  valuable  feedback 
received there and from the EU Centre. 
2  The  author  would  like  to  thank  the  EU  Centre 
Singapore for its kind support. 
3 Notable exceptions are Laffan (1997) on the EU budget 
in general and Lindner (2006) on the negotiations of the 
multiannual budgets. 
 
2.  Theoretical  framework  to  explain  policy 
change and stability 
 
a.  The EU budget as a policy framework 
 
The EU budget - just like the EU itself has been 
undergoing  varying  phases  of  relative 
continuity  and  change.  Given  the  budget’s 
overall  volume  (around  130  billion  euros  or 
SGD 225 billion p.a.) and the significance it has 
in  a  number  of  areas  in  European  policy-
making, it is much regarded as a policy field in 
its  own  right  while,  like  any  budget,  at  the 
same  time  mediating  (re)distributive  policies 
within  an  overall  framework.  This  working 
paper regards the EU budget as a distinct policy 
framework but extends its attention to major 
sectoral  policies.  Among  the  latter  are  re-
distributional policies like agriculture but also 
programmes with leveraging effect for growth-
enhancement,  cross-border  infrastructure, 
research or the EU’s foreign policy instruments. 
Changing specifications within sectoral policies 
can translate into significant deviations of the 
overall  budget  –  both  in  volume  and  in  its 
composition. 
 
In  this  paper  two  theoretical  approaches  are 
applied to explain continuity and change in the 
EU  budget.  These  two  have  been  selected 
because  they  are  particularly  suitable  in 
explaining  the  mechanisms  at  work  in  EU 
budget-making.  The  advocacy  coalition  and 
incrementalism  frameworks  will  be  first 
outlined,  and  then  tested  in  the  subsequent 
section by looking at recent and current policy 
developments.  Alternative  approaches  for 
conceptualising policy change include the idea 
of  ‘policy  streams’  (Ackrill  and  Kay  2011; 
Kingdon  1984,  1995)  and  ‘punctuated 
equilibrium’ (Baumgartner 2009; Baumgartner 
and  Jones  1993,  1991).  However,  these 
alternative approaches will not be discussed in 
this working paper.  
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b.  Policy subsystem and advocacy coalition 
 
One  of  the  leading  theories  for  explaining 
policy  change  is  the  ‘advocacy  coalition 
framework’  of  Paul  Sabatier  (1988;  Sabatier 
and  Jenkins-Smith  1993).  This  framework 
suggests  that  within  a  policy  subsystem  (e.g. 
education,  agriculture)  advocacy  coalitions 
advance or prevent policy change. The idea of 
advocacy coalitions being active within certain 
policies  is  more  flexible  but  also  theorised 
much more deeply by Sabatier et al. than were 
earlier  ideas  such  as  ‘iron  triangles’  (Jordan 
1981). The latter term is still widely referred to 
in analysis of the EU’s agricultural policy (Hix 
1999).  While  the  term  ‘iron  triangles’  often 
refers  to  a  particular  triangular  relationship 
between  legislative  committees,  executive 
departments and interest groups within a given 
policy field, Sabatier suggests a less static and 
more  flexible  definition  of  the  actors 
constituting the advocacy coalitions. 
 
Sabatier  (1988,  131)  bases  his  framework  on 
three  propositions.  First,  the  policy  at  stake 
needs  to  be  analysed  over  a  relatively  long 
time frame of ten years or more. Secondly, the 
locus  of  investigation  forms  a  ‘policy 
subsystem’  in  which  the  various  players 
interact. This would be a space broader than 
the  close  institutional  or  organisational 
framework  around  governments  (as  with 
traditional ‘iron triangles’) and  may include a 
much  greater  diversity  of  actors.  Thirdly, 
policies are similar to “belief systems” in the 
sense that Sabatier suggests that they contain 
clear ideas as to how to realise them. Within 
policy  subsystems there  is  usually  more  than 
one  advocacy  coalition.  These  compete  for 
attention  and  influence  and  their  activity  or 
impact is ultimately mediated by what Sabatier 
calls  “policy  brokers”  (ibid).  Over  time 
advocacy  coalitions  engage  in  learning  and 
might  also  adapt  their  strategies  (or  even 
objectives). But learning is not the only way to 
alter the discourse within a policy subsystem. 
 
According  to  Sabatier  there  are  also  external 
changes  that  influence  actors,  be  they  socio-
economic, technological, personal, (unintended) 
spill-overs  from  other  policies  or  ruling 
coalitions. What is particularly relevant in view 
of the following empirical analysis is Sabatier’s 
suggestion  that  changes  at  the  core  of 
advocacy coalitions’ interests are most likely to 
originate externally. Learning might affect the 
subsystem only at its margins. This leads him to 
the  hypothesis  that  the  “core  *…+  of  a 
governmental  program  [is]  unlikely  to  be 
significantly revised as long as the subsystem 
advocacy  coalition  which  instituted  the 
program  remains  in  power”  (Sabatier  1988, 
148).  External  events  can  augment  the 
resources of weaker advocacy coalitions vis-à-
vis the dominating one. 
 
When accepting the idea of advocacy coalitions 
within  the  EU  framework,  it  should  be 
expected that budget change is the exception 
rather than the norm given the prevalence of 
existing  advocacy  coalitions  and  the  high 
requirements  for  changing  the  status  quo.  If 
(rather incremental) change were to occur, it 
would  be  based  on  endogenous  effects 
(primarily learning - either within the dominant 
advocacy coalition or by challenging coalitions 
who  would  start  affecting  the  margins). 
Alternatively, or additionally, (more disruptive) 
change can originate in a number of exogenous 
factors (like enlargement following the break-
up of Soviet dominance over Eastern Europe, 
or the recent financial crisis). 
 
c.  Incrementalism 
 
Incrementalism  is  not  only  one  of  the  most 
widely debated ideas in public policy but often 
the point of reference in explaining the politics 
of  budgeting.  In  his  seminal  article  “The 
Science  of  ‘Muddling  Through’”,  Charles 
Lindblom  (1959)  describes  an  ultimately 
inachievable  method  for  policy  formation 
which would “continually build[s] out from the 
current  situation,  step-by-step  and  by  small 4 
 
degree” (Lindblom 1959, 81). First, even if an 
ideal solution can be defined, it is not always 
possible  to  implement  it  given  the  existing 
power  constellations  or  more  pressing  issues 
on the agenda. Second, smaller deviations from 
the status quo are less risky for policy-makers. 
Bolder  initiatives  usually  require  the 
investment of more political capital that might 
be used elsewhere. Such reasons can explain 
the  incremental  nature  of  policy-making 
according to Howlett et al. (2009). 
 
The  debate  on  incrementalism  in  budgeting 
was provoked by Aaron Wildavsky in his book 
The  Politics  of  the  Budgetary  Process  (1964). 
This  is  also  the  first  contribution  explicitly 
referring  to  “incrementalism”  (a  term  that 
Lindblom until then had merely circumscribed). 
In subsequent updates of his book, Wildavsky 
and Caiden (2004) offer a broad discussion and 
description of incrementalism in which they set 
out a clear summary of the argument:   “The 
largest determining factor of this year’s budget 
is last year’s. Most of each budget is a product 
of  previous  decisions.  *…+  Long-range 
commitments have been made, and this year’s 
share is scooped out of the total and included 
as part of the annual budget” (Wildavsky and 
Caiden 2004, 46). Despite their sole focus and 
concern about budgeting in the United States, 
many  of  their  suggestions  can  be  applied  or 
tested  in  any  other  budgetary  context  and 
specifically in the EU. 
 
Just like Lindblom and other defenders of the 
incremental  approach,  Wildavsky  shares  the 
understanding  that  rationality  assumptions 
cannot  be  fulfilled.  Decision-makers  do  not 
have  the  capacity  to  consider  all  alternative 
options across all policy fields and estimates to 
their  costs  and  benefits.  It  is  therefore  more 
convenient to tinker at the margins (Lindblom’s 
“muddling  through”)  or  to  compromise  with 
others  who  have  a  keen  interest  in  their 
specific  field  of  power  or  expertise.  Another 
limiting  factor  is  institutional  design. 
Fragmented, multi-step and bicameral systems 
(like the EU)
4 are most likely to find themselves 
with incremental budget change.  
 
 
3.  Politics at play in the EU budget 
This empirical section first clarifies the general 
opportunities  for  affecting  change  within  EU 
budget-making.  It  then  analyses  entry  points 
for  change  at  three  different  levels: 
constitutional,  the  Multiannual  Financial 
Framework  (MFF)  and policy-  or programme-
level.  These  three  layers  are  by  no  means 
exclusive and also allow for overlap. For each 
of  the  layers  recent  developments  will  be 
discussed to see how these in turn affect the 
budget. 
 
a.  Defining  and  understanding  budget 
change 
 
When talking about the change of something it 
is important to define what change means and 
how it differs from continuity of the status quo. 
Even  though  a  budget  is  very  much  about 
numbers,  it  makes  little  sense  to  assign  the 
attribute of change based on a certain amount 
or  percentage-threshold  because  each 
development needs to be contextualised. For 
example, when agricultural interventions drop 
by a billion euros, this might result in relatively 
big  financial  savings  but  underlying  EU 
programmes  might  not  have  changed.  Rising 
global  commodity  prices  could  account  for 
some  of  the  fall.  More  conceptually,  change 
could be measured against the following items: 
a) overall volume of the budget, b) distribution 
of  expenditures  between  the  different 
headings (or at programme level), c) reshuffling 
of power between the EU institutions. 
 
In  this  work,  developments  with  any 
implications for these three will be compared 
against the prolongation of the status quo, or 
                                                      
4 Practically all legislation as well as the annual budgets 
requires  the  approval  of  both  the  Council  and  the 
European Parliament. 5 
 
incremental  changes  as  outlined  above. 
Incrementalism  is  indeed  a  rather  typical 
phenomenon when it comes to the evolution 
of the EU budget. Almost all programmes are 
lined  out  within  the  overarching  seven-year 
framework  of  the  MFF.  The  Commission 
estimates  and  suggests  incremental  year-by-
year increases in all of them at the start of the 
MFF. More often than not, end-of-MFF figures 
are the base for future negotiations. Given the 
unanimity  principle  in  European  Council 
decision-making, and therefore the need to get 
various  perspectives  to  homogenize  at  a 
(presumably low) level comfortable for all, it is 
likely  that  a  gradual,  incremental  change  will 
characterise  at  least  the  major  spending 
programmes  (particularly  agriculture  and 
cohesion policy). 
 
Change to the EU budget can be instigated by 
four  institutions:  The  European  Council,  the 
Commission,  the  Council  of  the  European 
Union and the European Parliament (EP) – or 
rather individual actors within them. Over time, 
certain prevailing institutional interests in the 
budget process have evolved despite changing 
political  interests  within  them.  The  European 
Council  is  primarily  involved  in  the  MFF 
negotiations  in  which  government  leaders 
attempt to minimise their national budgetary 
contribution and eventually agree on a ceiling 
for  overall  (annual)  expenditures.  Heads  of 
government  also  bargain  over  the  general 
national  distribution  of  the  agricultural  and 
cohesion  budgets.  The  Council  is  involved  in 
the annual budget process where it normally 
strives  to  limit  EU  expenditures.  Each 
government  aims  at  ensuring  adequate 
national  returns  (‘juste  retour’)  where 
international redistributive issues arise.  
 
The  European  Parliament  on  the  other  hand 
claims  to  defend  the  interests  of  European 
citizens which often coincides with an interest 
in higher spending levels, particularly for those 
activities  where  public  goods  are  provided 
across Europe and national benefits cannot be 
easily measured. During the whole process the 
Commission  is  involved  as  initiator,  agenda-
setter, mediator and implementer. 
 
While the institutions’ formal roles and powers 
are  derived  from  the  Treaties,  institutional 
interests follow also the composition of each 
institution. EU enlargement - as most recently 
witnessed  in 2004  and 2007  - brought  about 
shifting  interests  within  all  institutions  but 
particularly the Council and the EP as most new 
member-states have income levels below the 
average of the (then) EU-15. This strengthened 
those advocacy coalitions supporting continuity 
in  cohesion  policy  and  agricultural  subsidies. 
Over a horizon of at least the next five years 
there  are  only  the  accessions  of  Croatia  and 
Iceland with a possible affect on power shifts. 
Given that they are relatively small economies, 
one below and one above average EU income 
levels, the impact of their accession on budget 
negotiations might be rather limited. 
 
b.  Institutional  budget  politics  after  the 
enactment of the Lisbon Treaty  
 
i.  Changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty 
 
The most important recent development with a 
likely  impact  on  the  budget  has  been  the 
implementation  of  the  Lisbon  Treaty.  With 
regards  to  the  budget  it  had  one  major 
institutional,  one  technical,  and  two  political 
implications. The biggest change with regard to 
the budget is the elimination of the distinction 
between  compulsory  and  non-compulsory 
expenditures. As a consequence, the European 
Parliament has gained full co-decision power - 
together  with  the  Council  –  over  all 
expenditures including agriculture. Unless both 
institutions agree on a common budget, there 
is no deal. This has at least formally enhanced 
the  EP’s  bargaining  position  towards  the 
Council.  Other  changes  in  the  Treaties  have 
political  implications.  First,  the  establishment 
of the European External Action Service (EEAS) 
has led the EP to use its budgetary powers over 6 
 
the financing to be involved in its functioning 
(see below) and secondly, the lowering of the 
requirements for a qualified majority (QMV) in 
the  Council  will  impact  its  decisions  after 
implementation  in  2014/17.  Finally,  the  MFF 
which  has  been  an  inter-institutional 
agreement  (IIA)  until  now  is  turned  into  a 
regulation  achieving  full  legal  character. 
However,  given  the  current practice, there  is 
no practical implication of this except that the 
Treaty  foresees  a  minimum  duration  of  five 
years instead of seven. This is shorter than the 
current seven-year framework but might affect 
MFFs only after 2020. 
 
ii.  Analysis of changes following the Lisbon 
Treaty 
 
The Treaty changes already led to considerable 
attention to budget-making at the end of 2010 
when the European Parliament (EP) provoked a 
stand-off over the 2011 budget. It was the first 
time in more than 20 years that there had not 
been a compromise after conciliation and the 
Commission had to come forward with a new 
proposal. The row was justified by the EP based 
on  two  arguments.  First,  the  2011  budget 
would  need  to  increase  with  the  regular 
expansion  as  programmed  in  the  MFF. 
Secondly,  it  would  not  be  appropriate  to 
discuss  and  prepare  the  revision  of  the  EU’s 
post-2014 financing rules, the Own Resources 
decision, without the inclusion of the EP in its 
negotiations. Even though these two issues are 
not linked to any formal provisions of the new 
Treaty  and  the  EP  could  have  blocked  the 
adoption of previous budgets as much as this 
one, the Parliament decided to move into full 
confrontation  with  the  Council  over  this  first 
budget being adopted under the Lisbon Treaty. 
In  the  end,  the  EP  settled  practically  at  the 
Council’s  position.  It  neither  got  a  binding 
commitment  to  be  formally  included  in  the 
Own  Resources  review,  nor  did  it  manage  to 
increase the budget beyond the 2.9% increase 
offered by the Council. 
It  remains  to  be  seen  if  the  Parliament  will 
become more assertive in future negotiations. 
So far it has shown only that it understands its 
new powers. In that way the Treaty change has 
yet to prove whether it will lead to change in 
the overall budget in the medium- to long-term. 
It can be expected that the Parliament will use 
its new powers particularly in the field where it 
has gained clout, namely agriculture. There is, 
however, a two-fold challenge which makes it 
hard to make a judgement at this point. First, 
the  current  agricultural  arrangements  have 
been  fixed  until  the  end  of  2013  through 
legislation and the current budget provisions. 
Due to high commodity and food prices, the EU 
has actually saved a few billion euros over the 
last years because it did not need to intervene 
in markets. On top of that, recent Parliament 
positions (Euractiv 2011) on the future of the 
Common  Agricultural    Policy  (CAP)  have 
indicated  that  there  exists  broad  support  for 
retaining current subsidy levels with only slight 
deviations in focus. 
 
In sum, the Treaty changes have not led to any 
tangible changes in the EU budget. However, 
the  Parliament  has  launched  a  warning  shot 
with its standoff over the 2011 budget. Even 
though  it  is  argued  here  that  this  is  in  part 
based  on  Treaty  changes,  the  EP  could  have 
equally  refused to  agree  to the budget  in all 
previous years. The crucial issue in the future is 
the  CAP.  Here  the  Parliament  could  start  to 
make a difference in the upcoming programme 
negotiations as well as in the overall MFF for 
2014-20. 
 
 
c.  The  current  Multiannual  Financial 
Framework (MFF) 2007-13 
 
i.  Overall framework 
 
After fixing the annual contributions to the EU 
budget every seven years, the EU’s MFFs have 
a binding and thereby much more determinant 
role  than  the  medium-term  budget 7 
 
frameworks  of  many  EU  member  states.  The 
effective setting of binding revenue thresholds 
(via the Own Resources decision) limits the size 
of  annual  EU  budgets.  But  not  only  is  the 
budgetary  volume  limited,  also  ceilings  for 
each of the seven headings
5 (policy fields) are 
set  so  that  redeployment  between  policies 
(headings) is hardly possible. 
 
The  current  MFF  w as  formally  adopted  in 
spring  2006  by  the  European  Parliament, 
Council  and  Commission  after  a  part icularly 
controversial compromise within the European 
Council  in  December  2005.  Given  that 
unanimity is required among governments for 
the  Own Resources decision,  any outcome is 
difficult  and  follows  harsh  negotiations. 
Unanimity also leads to a strong status quo 
bias,  supporting  the  incrementalist 
propositions when it comes to the MFF. 
 
Despite  a  difficult  settlement  following  the 
fierce fighting over the adoption of the current 
MFF in 2005 and 2006, the final compromise 
has not endured for too long.  In its first three 
years,  the MFF has been revised annually to 
cater for the financing of various ‘emergency’ 
situations (the Galileo satellite project, a food 
facility, economic stimulus).
6 Such revisions of 
the  MFF  had  not  happen ed  since  the  mid -
1990s (Lindner 2006). 
 
With  the  adoption  of  their  position  in  the 
European Council in December 2005, the heads 
of state also called for a Budget Review to be 
published  by  t he  Commission  in  2008/9  
(Council  of  the  European  Union  2005 ).  This 
review  (European  Commission  2010 )  was 
eventually published in October 2010 to  kick 
                                                      
5  An  overview  of  the  current  headings  and  their 
distribution within the current MFF is provided on the 
Commission’s website,     
http://ec.europa.eu/budget/prior_future/fin_framework
_en.htm, 2011-02-13. 
6 Overview at 
http://ec.europa.eu/budget/library/prior_future/overvie
w_MFF_modifications_en.pdf, 2011-02-13. 
off  the  debate  over  the  subsequent  MFF.  As 
the  next  step,  the  Commission  has  recently 
opened  the  negotiations  over  the  MFF  from 
2014  to  2020.
7 The  financial  framew ork  and 
the Own Resources decision should be adopted 
by the end of 2012. 
 
ii.  A mixed picture of change in the MFF 
 
Many incrementalist suggestions appear valid 
when  looking  at  the  MFF  overall  and  its 
sectoral  policies.  Individual  programmes  are 
specifically  designed  and  planned  with 
incremental  increases  year-by-year  to  match 
the  absorption  capacity  of  member  states  or 
actors in their sector (see Table 1). Even when 
moving from one MFF to the next, the share of 
key policies like the CAP and structural funds in 
the  overall  budget  has  remained  remarkably 
stable since 1988, if decreasing incrementally.
8 
 
However,  a  closer  review  of  incrementalism 
brings  to  light  that  significant  change  does 
occur  and  even  within  the  current  MFF 
considerable  adjustments  have  happen ed. 
Though the overall shares of the headings have 
not changed  much compared to the previous 
MFF,  within  specific  policies  like  agriculture , 
funds have been shifted from traditional into 
sustainable farming and subsidies  have been 
decoupled from production. Recent years have 
seen a big uptake of new programmes and 
activities  especially  under  the  heading  of  
justice and security while other programmes in 
the  field  of  SME  support,  innovation  and 
climate  change  have  seen  more  than 
incremental growth since 2007. The picture of 
budget  change  in  the  EU  is  therefore 
complicated and incrementalism is helpful but 
not  sufficient  to  explain  the  various 
developments  in  particular  within  specific 
policies and programmes. 
                                                      
7All proposed documents at 
http://ec.europa.eu/budget/biblio/documents/fin_fwk1
420/fin_fwk1420_en.cfm, 2011-07-19. 
8 See Lindner  (2006, 221f) for overviews of MFFs since 
1988. 8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For  instance,  while  heading  1a  (including 
measures  like  research  and  education  to 
enhance Europe’s competitiveness) was hailed 
as a cornerstone of the EU’s 2000/2005 Lisbon 
Agenda for growth and employment (European 
Council,  2005a) the  figures  in tables  1  and 2 
show  that  the  share  of  its  programmes  is 
rather  small.  While  cohesion  policy  could  be 
used to further the same objectives, the policy 
remains  primarily  a  supranational 
redistributive source for poorer regions with a 
lot of leeway as to what can be financed with it. 
An  indicative  attribution  of  ‘competitive’ 
policies and those creating a ‘European added 
value’  on  the  one  hand  and  redistributional 
policies on the other hand (see table 2) shows 
that  future-oriented  and  non-redistributive 
policies  do  exist  in  the  EU   budget  but  their 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
share  of  the  overall  budget  remains  rather 
small.  It  is  also  indicative  that  if  one  billion 
euros out of almost 50 billion euros (i.e. 2%) 
were underspent on agricultural subsidies and 
shifted into heading 3a or 3b, this could almost 
double the respective expenditures there. High 
prices  on  world  commodity  markets  allowed 
the EU in 2008 to save significant amounts it 
would have spent on price support  otherwise. 
This eased the Commission’s propensity to ask 
for a redeployment of these funds to be used 
for the Galileo project and later for the food 
facility. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Financial framework 2007-2013 (current prices in million euros) 
 
Commitment appropriations  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  2012  2013 
Total 
2007-13 
Share 
1. Sustainable Growth  53,979  57,653  61,696  63,555  63,974  66,964  69,957  437,778  44.9% 
1a Competitiveness for Growth 
and Employment 
8,918  10,386  13,269  14,167  12,987  14,203  15,433  89,363  9.2% 
1b  Cohesion  for  Growth  and 
Employment 
45,061  47,267  48,427  49,388  50,987  52,761  54,524  348,415  35.7% 
2.  Preservation  and 
Management  of  Natural 
Resources 
55,143  59,193  56,333  59,955  60,338  60,81  61,289  413,061  42.3% 
of  which:  market  related 
expenditure  and  direct 
payments 
45,759  46,217  46,679  47,146  47,617  48,093  48,574  330,085  33.8% 
3.  Citizenship,  freedom, 
security and justice 
1,273  1,362  1,518  1,693  1,889  2,105  2,376  12,216  1.3% 
3a  Freedom,  Security  and 
Justice 
637  747  867  1,025  1,206  1,406  1,661  7,549  0.8% 
3b Citizenship  636  615  651  668  683  699  715  4,667  0.5% 
4. EU as a global player  6,578  7,002  7,44  7,893  8,43  8,997  9,595  55,935  5.7% 
5. Administration 1  7,039  7,38  7,525  7,882  8,334  8,67  9,095  55,925  5.7% 
6. Compensations  445  207  210 
       
862  0.1% 
Total commitment 
appropriations 
124,46  132,8  134,72  140,98  142,97  147,55  152,31  975,777  100% 
as a percentage of GNI  1,02%  1,08%  1,16%  1,18%  1,16%  1,15%  1,14%  1,13%   
Source: Commission 9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
While much has remained the same, the three 
revisions  of  the  MFF  in  2007  (Galileo),  2008 
(food  facility)  and  2009  (European  Economic 
Recovery  Plan,  EERP)  are  interesting  cases  of 
budget  change.  As  argued  elsewhere  (Seifert 
forthcoming)  the  latter  two  interventions 
required no particular action at the EU-level.  
 
Galileo,  on  the  other  hand,  is  a  genuinely 
European  project  but  its  financing  difficulties 
could  have  been  equally  matched  by 
intergovernmental  bargaining  and  national 
contributions.  In  all  of  these  three  cases  the 
Commission  took  the  initiative  and  its 
President   (Barroso)  seized   the   moment                  by 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
acting  through  EU  measures  and  through 
financial  provision  out  of  the  EU  budget.  By 
doing so, the Commission not only managed to 
redeploy  funds  out  of  the  agriculture  budget 
within a simplified legal threshold (of around 
four  billion  euros),  but  more  importantly  it 
created a precedent for the future. One of the 
Commission’s  most  frequent  criticisms  of  the 
MFF  has  been  its  inflexibility  and  ability  to 
react to a changing economic and international 
environment.  These  limitations  affect 
particularly  new  challenges  to  which  the  EU 
might  like  to  attach  more  than  marginal 
resources. 
 
Table 2: character of expenditure headings 
Commitment appropriations 
Total 
2007-13 
Description  Character 
1. Sustainable Growth  437,778     
1a  Competitiveness  for 
Growth and Employment 
89,363 
energy,  transport, 
research etc. 
competitive,  growth-enhancing, 
added value 
1b  Cohesion  for  Growth  and 
Employment 
348,415 
structural  funds, 
social fund 
redistributive,  assigned  to 
countries in advance 
2.  Preservation  and 
Management  of  Natural 
Resources 
413,061 
CAP  (subsidies  + 
rural development) 
rural  development:  assigned  to 
countries  in  advance,  can  create 
added value 
of  which:  market  related 
expenditure  and  direct 
payments 
330,085 
standard  subsidies, 
excludes  rural 
development 
redistributive,  assigned  to 
countries in advance 
3.  Citizenship,  freedom, 
security and justice 
12,216 
   
3a  Freedom,  Security  and 
Justice 
7,549 
security-oriented  European added value
1 
3b Citizenship  4,667 
citizen-exchange 
oriented 
competitive,  European  added 
value 
4. EU as a global player  55,935 
Foreign  policy  and 
aid 
European  added  value, 
competitive 
5. Administration 1 
55,925 
civil  service  and 
translation 
European added value 
6. Compensations  862 
transition payments 
to  Romania  & 
Bulgaria 
redistributive,  assigned  to 
countries in advance 
Total commitment 
appropriations 
975,777 
   
Sources: Commission for data, Seifert for evaluation 
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Despite  these  revisions  –  none  of  which 
accounted  for  more  than  four  billion  euros  - 
the  MFF  has  been  remarkably  stable.  The 
Commission and the European Parliament have 
indicated  from  time  to  time  their  interest  to 
embark on wider ranging budget increases but 
it has been understood that the broad majority 
of member states within the Council is against 
any departure from the 2006 agreement. The 
advocacy  coalition  of  the  big  net-paying 
countries  surprisingly  has  not  resisted  such 
intentions and it is unlikely that their national 
financial  interests  will  change  by  2013 
particularly in light of rising debt levels across 
the  EU.  But  the  relative  overall  stability  also 
points  to  the  most  relevant  entry  point  for 
budget  change  –  the  negotiations  over  the 
post-2013 framework that started in June 2011. 
 
d.  Policy-  and  programme-level 
developments 
 
i.  Description 
 
Practically all expenditure in the EU is based on 
programmes and either follows clear guidelines 
for  eligibility  (e.g.  single  farm  payment)  or 
competitive tenders (e.g. research, innovation). 
These  programmes  are  normally  established 
alongside  the  MFF  and  run  for  the  same 
duration. Their financial allocation is therefore 
fixed over seven years. The only elements that 
might  be  adapted  through  their  lifetime  are 
eligibility criteria and the scope of programmes. 
It is therefore hardly possible to introduce any 
new  programme,  or  new  budget  lines  within 
existing programmes, because there is simply 
no funding available given the volume of the 
current MFF which is fully allocated. Change is 
therefore  limited  –  except  for  the  unlikely 
possibility of cuts. 
 
ii. Recent developments 
 
Three developments deserve mention as they 
might  have  wider  implications:  first,  the  so-
called review debate over the revision of the 
MFF  which  had  been  initiated  as  part  of  a 
broader  consultation  process  by  the 
Commission  in  September  2007  (European 
Commission 2007); secondly, the negotiations 
over the funding and set-up of the European 
External Action Service (EEAS) as stipulated by 
the Lisbon Treaty; and thirdly, the negotiations 
over the 2011 budget  and recent attempts to 
cut back on funding to the EU budget. 
 
As  part  of  the  2005  budget  deal  in  the 
European Council the Commission was tasked 
to initiate a review in 2008/9 (Council of the 
European  Union  2005).  The  Commission 
decided  to  pursue  this  review  with  a  broad 
public consultation starting in September 2007 
and  closing  with  a  conference  in  November 
2008.  Hardly  any  previous  Commission 
consultation had received so much attention or 
so  many  contributions.
9 However,  the 
Commission President decided to postpone the 
adoption of a formal summary and concrete 
suggestions  for  the  next  MFF  until  October 
2010 when his College of Commissioners was 
re-elected. The Communication, as eventually 
presented  (European  Commission,  2010)  fell 
short of concrete initiatives and is modest in its 
proposals where they exist. While it is not up 
to the Commission to decide over the next MFF 
and the willingness to move on seems rather 
limited at least in the Council, it was a missed 
opportunity  to  initiate  change  with  a ny 
proposals that deviate further from the status 
quo. The immediate distancing from a leaked 
draft  document  outlining  a  slightl y  more 
progressive  departure  from  the  current 
agricultural policy in autumn 2009
10 indicates 
that existing advocacy coalitions (in particular 
industrial  farmers)  seem  to  maintain  their 
power. 
 
                                                      
9 See 
http://ec.europa.eu/budget/reform/issues/read_en.htm, 
2011-02-14. 
10 Euractiv,  http://www.euractiv.com/en/cap/eu-farm-
budget-set-escape-deep-austerity-cuts-news-499045, 
2011-02-14. 11 
 
The second development is linked to the entry 
into force of the Lisbon Treaty. With the set-up 
of  the  new  EEAS  its  formal  institutional  role 
needed  to  be  clarified  between  Council, 
Commission  and  Parliament.  After  intense 
negotiations it was agreed that the EEAS would 
become a separate institution sui generis that 
was  detached  from  both  Council  and 
Commission. The new service was not only to 
take over new responsibilities but also to grow 
considerably  in  size,  which  requires  new 
financing arrangements. Some Members of the 
European Parliament (MEPs) attempted to use 
staff funding rules to obtain concessions over 
the  direction  and  management  of  the  EEAS. 
Negotiations  were  tough  and  endured  for 
several  months  in  2010;  these  not  only 
involved staff-financing but later also coincided 
with the broader fight over the 2011 budget. 
 
Two conflicts converged in these negotiations. 
First, the Parliament tried to extend its power 
in  matters  of  foreign  policy  –  and  used  its 
budgetary  prerogatives  to  achieve  this. 
Secondly, the debate over the staffing of the 
EEAS, which is supposed to comprise at least a 
third  of  national  diplomats,  illustrated  the 
underfunding  of  the  EU’s  foreign  policy 
apparatus. Particularly this latter point should 
have  ramifications  for  the  negotiations  over 
the next MFF as it is clear that a foreign service 
without  sufficient  financing  for  its  personnel 
will not be able to deliver on the EU’s global 
ambitions. Despite the MEPs’ attempts to rule 
heavily on the EEAS (in line with powers the US 
Senate enjoys) the compromise reached is far 
away  from  their  initial  demands  and  leaves 
sufficient  executive  flexibility.  It  is in  essence 
not  much  different  from  the  prior 
arrangements with the notable deviation that 
Parliament will be more broadly informed and 
consulted. This might illustrate that MEPs as an 
advocacy  coalition  have  achieved  changes  at 
the  margins  and  provoked  learning  moments 
for all institutions while member states and in 
parts  the  Commission  have  retained  their 
upper hand in foreign policy. 
The  third  development  concerns  the  more 
recent  attempt  to  cut  EU  funding.  Following 
strict austerity packages at home and with the 
eurozone  crisis  unfolding,  a  number  of  EU 
governments  under  the  leadership  of  the  UK 
felt that the suggested increase  for the 2011 
EU budget of an envisaged 6% was over the top. 
UK Prime Minister Cameron took the issue up 
to the European Council meeting in December 
2010 where he received principled support for 
his  position  from  some  key  governments
11 
notably Germany and France . However, even 
given the severe austerity constraints and  an 
increasing number of eurosceptic governments 
the 2011 budget still  contains  an increase of 
spending of 2.9% while many national budgets 
are  undergoing  serious  cutbacks.  This  might 
underline  the  incremental  nature  of the  EU 
budget but also the persistence of advocacy  
coalitions within the institutions  whose veto-
powers are strong enough both to prevent cuts 
and secure incremental increases. 
 
e.  Summary 
 
Overall, moments of change appear to be rare 
events  in  EU  budget-making.  Since  2005  few 
initiatives of change could be identified. Table 
3 provides an overview of these.  
 
It can be summarised that no initiative has led 
to any thorough overhaul of existing policies or 
a  dramatic  reshuffling  of  funds.  This  might 
come as a surprise given that the share of the 
overall distribution within the EU budget and 
its  heavy  focus  on  agricultural  interventions 
and  inter-regional  redistribution  has  not 
changed much since the 1980s. With the world 
undergoing  dramatic  changes,  one  might 
wonder if these spending priorities are right for 
the future. From an analytical point of view the 
lack of changes might surprise less because of 
the resilience of dominant advocacy coalitions 
that  ferment  the  status  quo.  In  terms  of the  
                                                      
11 See Euractiv 
http://www.euractiv.com/en/priorities/cameron-rallies-
troops-budget-battle-news-500736, 2011-02-14. 12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
institutional  roles  three  conclusions  might  be 
drawn from the previous analysis. 
 
First,  the  Commission  appears  as  the  most 
schizophrenic change agent. On the one hand, 
it  let  go  of  change-promoting  opportunities 
when it came to the budget review debate or 
the establishment of the  EEAS.  On the other 
hand,  it  appeared  as  the  most  able 
entrepreneur  when  securing  additional  funds 
through the three revisions in 2007-2009. The 
European  Parliament  has  launched  a  few 
attempts to gain powers and secure additional 
funding  but  has  repeatedly  given  in  as 
negotiations  became  serious.  The  eventual 
compromise over the 2011 budget is a case in 
point  as  it  practically  adopted  the  Council’s 
position.  Finally,  the  Council  appears  as  the 
least  keen  on  change  –  and  it  successfully 
retains  the  status  quo  with  incremental 
changes. However, it has also failed to cut back 
EU  funding  because  it  could  not  mobilise 
enough  support  to  challenge  the  entrenched 
interests. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
f.  Evidence  for  change  and  stability  – 
reviewing the theory 
 
Both  theoretical  approaches,  the  advocacy 
coalition framework and incrementalism, have 
been  helpful  concepts  to  understand  change 
and stability in the EU budget. Incrementalism 
is a particularly useful concept to explain the 
broader  development  of  the  EU  within  the 
seven-year  MFF.  Change  is  foreseeable, 
programmed  and  gradual  with  its  annual 
increases.  Even  between  MFFs  there  is  not 
much  deviation.  Incrementalism  therefore 
helps to explain the status quo bias. 
 
Advocacy coalitions on the other hand help us 
to  understand  successful  and  unsuccessful 
challenges to the EU budget. Broadly speaking 
the  major  advocacy  coalitions  of  subsidised 
farmers  and  cohesion-beneficiaries  persist  to 
the  extent  that  their  share  of  the  overall 
budget  has  remained  remarkably  stable  over 
the years. On top of that, rules defining subsidy 
recipients have only been marginally modified. 
Alternative  coalitions  within  these  respected 
subsystems  have  not  proven  to  possess 
substantive  power  to  challenge  existing 
Table 3: Attempted change in the EU budget 
Event  Initiator  Element of change  Sustainable impact 
Lisbon Treaty  All  Full co-decision power of EP  Yes, but limited 
MFF 2007-13  All, EP more  Increased  funding  in  justice  and 
home  affairs,  foreign  policy 
(CFSP),  competitiveness/growth/ 
research 
Yes, programmes likely to 
increase further 
Revisions  of 
MFF 
Commission  Additional  funding  for 
Commission priorities, use of MFF 
flexibility to establish precedent 
Not  in  terms  of  priorities 
but  likely  to  improve 
future MFF flexibility 
Budget 2011  Council  Relative cut  No 
Establishment 
of EEAS 
EP  Use  of  budgetary  power  to 
influence  policy,  debate  over 
future CFSP funding 
Partly:  CFSP  funding  to 
remain  an  issue;  EP 
oversight  power  only  as 
powerful as MEPs want to 
play it 
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provisions.  They  appear  to  be  too  diverse, 
fragmented  or  lacking  the  resources  to 
confront the dominant actors. But even within 
these two areas policy-learning is taking place. 
Think-tanks, MEPs, the Commission and some 
governments  have  been  pushing  for  a  more 
stringent focus on competitiveness, others for 
broader  social  concerns  in  the  allocation  of 
structural funds – and programmes have been 
adjusted.  At  the  same  time  dairy  farmers, 
environmentalists and agricultural economists 
have  argued  successfully  for  increasing 
amounts  of  agricultural  support  for  rural 
development  initiatives and more  sustainable 
farming. 
 
Only  the  three  revisions  of  the  budgetary 
framework  are  more  difficult  to  explain  with 
either  theory.  A  critic  would  argue  that  the 
changes  are  not  relevant  to  the  overall 
allocations  and  therefore  in  line  with  the 
incrementalist  perspective.  But,  each  in  their 
own  right,  these  initiatives  have  received 
remarkable  funding  of  around  or  over  one 
billion euros each. Only in the case of Galileo 
can one see some advocacy coalitions at work. 
The food facility and the EERP really came out 
of  the  Commission  President’s  office  without 
building  on  any  particular  support  group  or 
network (Seifert, forthcoming). This illustrates 
that  the  advocacy  coalition  framework  has 
problems in explaining top-level executive-led 
initiatives which are not based on prior public 
deliberations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.  Conclusion 
 
This work has looked at change and continuity 
in  the  EU  budget.  Over  three  layers  - 
constitutional  change,  the  Multiannual 
Financial Framework and policy-level initiatives 
- changes have been discussed. During the last 
five  years  a  few  attempts  for  change  have 
taken  place  but  none  has  succeeded  with 
significant  alterations.  In  order  to 
conceptualise  change,  this  work  has  drawn 
from  Wildavsky’s  (1964)  theory  of 
incrementalism and Sabatier’s (1988) advocacy 
coalition  framework.  These  theories  help  to 
explain  the  dominant  status  quo  bias  in  EU 
budgeting  but  fall  short  of  explaining  the 
executive-led initiatives to fund new activities 
(through the revisions of the MFF). More work 
needs to be done to understand change that 
appears  out  of  the  executive’s  (Commission) 
black box. At the same time the Commission 
appears  as  a  particularly  interesting  case  of 
leaving out several more obvious opportunities 
for change (like the budget review) while at the 
same  time  engaging  in  and  succeeding  with 
respect to other less expected projects (like the 
food  facility  or  EERP).  The  proposals  brought 
forward for the EU’s next multiannual budget 
from  2014-2020  appear  as  an  interesting 
testing  ground.  With  its  pitch  for  two  new 
genuinely  European  financing  sources  on  the 
basis  of  a  VAT  [GST]  share  and  a  financial 
transaction  tax,  the  Commission  has  made  a 
bold proposal for transferring new powers to 
‘Brussels’ for the financing of the EU budget.  
How  this  will  pan  out  in  the  long  drawn 
negotiations ahead for the 2014-2020 MFF will 
generate  further  perspectives  on  change  and 
stability in the EU budget. 
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